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How do we know how much control we have over our environment? The sense of
agency refers to the feeling that we are in control of our actions, and that, through
them, we can control our external environment. Thus, agency clearly involves matching
intentions, actions, and outcomes. The present studies investigated the possibility that
processes of action selection, i.e., choosing what action to make, contribute to the
sense of agency. Since selection of action necessarily precedes execution of action,
such effects must be prospective. In contrast, most literature on sense of agency
has focussed on the retrospective computation whether an outcome fits the action
performed or intended. This hypothesis was tested in an ecologically rich, dynamic
task based on a computer game. Across three experiments, we manipulated three
different aspects of action selection processing: visual processing fluency, categorization
ambiguity, and response conflict. Additionally, we measured the relative contributions of
prospective, action selection-based cues, and retrospective, outcome-based cues to
the sense of agency. Manipulations of action selection were orthogonally combined with
discrepancy of visual feedback of action. Fluency of action selection had a small but
reliable effect on the sense of agency. Additionally, as expected, sense of agency was
strongly reduced when visual feedback was discrepant with the action performed. The
effects of discrepant feedback were larger than the effects of action selection fluency,
and sometimes suppressed them. The sense of agency is highly sensitive to disruptions
of action-outcome relations. However, when motor control is successful, and action-
outcome relations are as predicted, fluency or dysfluency of action selection provides
an important prospective cue to the sense of agency.
Keywords: sense of agency, action selection, motor control, metacognition, fluency
INTRODUCTION
As we interact with the world around us, our experience is typically colored by a sense of agency,
a feeling that we are in control of our actions and, through them, can control events in the
outside world (Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009). The human sense of agency is a critical part of our
subjective experience, and serves to ground our sense of self (Knoblich et al., 2003). Its importance
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is further highlighted in several pathologies that involve
disorders of the sense of agency, such as schizophrenia,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, or alien-hand syndrome (Moore
and Fletcher, 2012). Finally, our experience of agency also
underlies our societal notions of responsibility, and “free will,” on
which our legal system is based (Spence, 2009).
Much research has focused on how actions are linked to
their outcomes. This has shown that the sense of agency
depends on a retrospective comparison between expected or
desired action outcomes and actual outcomes (e.g., Wegner
and Wheatley, 1999; Blakemore et al., 2002). Moreover, the
importance of linking intentions and actions has been recently
highlighted (for a review, see Chambon et al., 2014b). In fact,
modern theoretical frameworks emphasize that the sense of
agency results from the integration of multiple cues (Synofzik
et al., 2008; Moore and Fletcher, 2012), which may become
available at different times (Haggard and Chambon, 2012; Farrer
et al., 2013). Moreover, metacognitive processes are involved in
evaluating the output of action and outcome monitoring systems
(Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Haggard and Chambon, 2012; but
see Chambon et al., 2014a).
Recent studies have used subliminal priming of actions to
manipulate the fluency of action selection, in a simple paradigm
in which participants respond according to directional arrows
and trigger the appearance of colored circles (Wenke et al.,
2010; Chambon and Haggard, 2012; Chambon et al., 2013, 2015;
Sidarus et al., 2013). Participants report a reduced sense of
agency over action outcomes when primes induce dysfluent,
compared to fluent, action selection. Similar findings have also
been seen with response conflict induced by supraliminal stimuli,
i.e., incongruent flankers (Sidarus and Haggard, 2016). Therefore,
a metacognitive signal about the (dys)fluency of action selection
processes contributes to the sense of agency prospectively, and
long before the outcome is known.
Interestingly, it has been shown that judgements of agency
(JoAs) are influenced by the metacognitive monitoring of
performance in a game, but are still highly sensitive to actual
disruptions of control (Metcalfe and Greene, 2007). In these
studies, a computer game was used in which participants move
a mouse cursor (a box) along a horizontal bar to catch falling Xs,
while avoiding Os. Participant’s motor actions produce two levels
of outcome. First, moving the mouse leads to the cursor moving
on the screen: this may be considered the proximal outcome.
Introducing a discrepancy between one’s mouse movements and
cursor movements (termed “turbulence”) leads to a reduction
in both performance and judgements of performance (JoPs),
but an even greater reduction in JoAs. Importantly, multiple
regression models confirmed that the large reduction in JoAs
due to discrepant feedback could not be fully explained by
reductions in performance. In the same task, a second, distal
level of outcome occurs. The participant’s goal is to catch Xs,
thus making them disappear, and the motion of the visual cursor
is the means whereby they achieve this goal. In trials in which
Xs could sometimes disappear autonomously, participants were
aware of the corresponding improvement in their performance,
but reported a reduced sense of agency compared to trials where
Xs could only disappear because they participant caught them.
Notably, the reduction in JoAs due to discrepant feedback was
much greater than the reduction associated with Xs disappearing
unexpectedly. That is, the sense of agency is more sensitive to
disruption of proximal outcomes, compared to distal outcomes
(cf. Metcalfe et al., 2013). Together, these results suggest that the
sense of agency is preferentially tuned to monitor proximal cues,
tied to action and motor control.
Here we introduce a new potential cue to sense of agency in
the same task, by varying the difficulty of action selection. In
this task, we may consider that an action consists of moving the
cursor to the horizontal location of a target (i.e., an X). This
means action selection would be determined by: first, detecting
a stimulus; second, categorizing it as a target or distractor; and,
third, deciding whether to move the cursor toward it (for targets),
while also avoiding distractor stimuli (i.e., O’s). Therefore, with
some changes to the stimuli, we could manipulate these three
different stages of action selection.
This allowed us to test the generalisability of the effects
of action selection across manipulations, but also in a
dynamic environment, with greater ecological validity than the
experimental paradigms typically used to study the sense of
agency. In goal-directed action, the sense of agency depends
on both prospective factors, and on proximal outcomes that
constitute the means for achieving the goal, in addition to the
actual goal itself. Therefore, we additionally aimed to compare the
relative contribution to sense of agency of both prospective cues
and proximal outcomes, for the same task, and the same distal
goal. Manipulations of action selection were thus combined with
manipulating the relation between one’s movement and the visual
cursor used to catch the Xs.
Many studies have shown that fluency in visual processing
or decision-making can affect a variety of judgements, such
as confidence, liking, or familiarity (for a review, see Alter
and Oppenheimer, 2009). Previous studies, which used action
priming, argued that action selection fluency influences the sense
of agency (e.g., Wenke et al., 2010). Priming can influence
processing fluency, in addition to inducing response conflict,
but it remains unclear whether fluency in perceptual processing
alone could have a similar effect on the sense of agency. To
test this, in Experiment 1, we manipulated stimulus processing
fluency through visual masking. This essentially disrupted the
very first stage of the stimulus-response-outcome chain, namely,
identifying and locating target stimuli. If fluency in action
selection has a general effect on the sense of agency, we would
predict that this manipulation would lead to a reduced sense of
agency.
In Experiment 2, we manipulated the uncertainty associated
with categorizing stimuli as targets or distractors by varying
stimulus ambiguity. When categorizing highly ambiguous
stimuli, uncertainty about the accuracy of the categorization
would be higher. It has been suggested that the consequences of
uncertain decisions may be seen as less blame-worthy than the
consequences of more informed decisions (Heath and Tversky,
1991). Thus, greater uncertainty during action selection could
lead to a reduction in the sense of agency. Additionally, a
large number of highly ambiguous stimuli would render action
selection processes more difficult, as many items would be hard
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to categorize. This increased difficulty could also lead to a lower
sense of agency.
Finally, in Experiment 3, we interfered with the later,
pre-motor aspects of action selection, namely, deciding whether
to approach or avoid a given stimulus. Response conflict was
induced by placing incongruent flankers around central targets
or distractors (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). For example, M could
indicate targets and C indicate distractors. These items would
appear surrounded by congruent (e.g., MMM) or incongruent
(e.g., CMC) flankers. The simultaneous detection of a target and a
distractor would suggest two conflicting responses: approach and
avoid that spatial location. Detecting a distractor flanker could
elicit an avoidant response, which would need to be overcome
if it was flanking a target; while an approach response could
be erroneously elicited by a target flanker placed around a
distractor. A condition in which only congruently flanked items
appeared was compared to a condition in which most items were
congruently flanked, and to a condition in which few items were
congruently flanked. The overall degree of response conflict was
expected to lead to a corresponding reduction in the sense of
agency.
EXPERIMENT 1
This experiment investigated the effects of visual processing
fluency on the sense of agency, by adding a visual noise mask on
the screen in some trials.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-three Columbia University or Barnard College students
volunteered to participate for course credit, and gave written
informed consent (12 female, mean age = 20.05, SD = 2.52,
age not recorded for 1 person due to technical error). All were
right-handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and
neurologically healthy. The procedures described here conform
to the guidelines of the APA concerning the protection of human
subjects, and were approved by the Columbia Internal Review
Board.
Apparatus
The experiments were conducted on iMac computers, using
a mouse on mouse pad. The program was developed using
custom-built scripts running on Python. White Xs and Os
were presented on a gray background. Each trial started with
10 stimuli of each type (targets vs. distractors). In unmasked
trials, the background was gray (115/255 RGB scale). In masked
trials, the noise mask consisted of a Gaussian-filtered patch
of randomly distributed grayscale intensities. This was applied
on top of the main game screen, except for the half gray
horizontal bar and white box (i.e., the mouse cursor), which
were drawn on top of the mask. This enabled masking of the
stimuli based on which participants decided what to do, while
allowing participants to track their movements equally well in
both masked and unmasked conditions. On some trials, we also
introduced a discrepancy between the participant’s movements
FIGURE 1 | Task outline for Experiment 1. Visual processing fluency was
manipulated by adding a visual noise mask on some trials. After playing the
game for 30 s, participants gave judgements of agency (on a red VAS),
followed by judgements of performance (blue VAS).
of the mouse, and the movements of the cursor on the screen,
termed “turbulence.” In the turbulence condition, the movement
of the box depended on the following noise function:
1x
′ = 1x+ σ sin(2pit/2.4)
where 1x′ is the movement of the box on the screen, 1x is the
distance the participant actually moved the mouse, t is time in
seconds, and σ is the amplitude of the noise wave.
Design and Procedure
The basic procedure and instructions are described elsewhere
(Metcalfe and Greene, 2007). Briefly, participants played a game
in which they observed Xs and Os scrolling down a screen,
and moved a white box along a gray horizontal track with a
mouse (see Figure 1). Participants were instructed to catch one
letter with their white box (e.g., Xs), while avoiding the other
letter (e.g., Os; counterbalanced between participants). Once
caught, the items disappeared, and auditory feedback indicated
whether a target or distractor was hit, with a ping or thud
sound, respectively. If the items were not caught, they continued
scrolling down to the bottom of the screen.
Participants played the game for 30 s, and then gave JoAs
and JoPs about the game they had just played. For the JoAs,
participants were asked to judge how much control they felt
over the game, using a red visual analog scale (VAS) ranging
from “No Control” to “Full Control.” For JoPs, participants
were asked to rate their performance in the game using a blue
VAS, ranging from “None Correct” to “Completely Correct.”
Participants moved a slider with the mouse, and pressed the space
bar to select their rating.
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To influence action selection, the fluency of visual processing
was manipulated by either presenting a normal screen
(“unmasked” trials), or adding a visual noise mask on top
of the game (“masked” trials; see Figure 1). This masking made
it harder to detect the targets and distractors, thus rendering
action selection more difficult. Additionally, to interfere with
proximal outcome monitoring, the movements of the mouse
cursor (the white box) were manipulated. In some trials,
the cursor accurately followed the movement of the mouse
(“no turbulence”). In other trials, a noise function was applied
to the movements of the cursor (“turbulence”). These two
manipulations, visual masking and cursor turbulence, were
factorially combined, resulting in four trial (i.e., game)
types. These were quasi-randomized across six blocks,
such that each trial type was played once before the next
block.
Before starting the experiment, participants played a training
game, followed by JoAs and JoPs. They were given a chance to ask
any questions, and either play another training game, or start the
experiment. At the end of the experiment, participants answered
a short questionnaire about the experiment and were debriefed.
Data Analysis
Performance in the game was assessed as a d’ score from signal
detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966), which measured
discrimination between targets and distractors. The d’ calculation
was adjusted for instances of zero false alarms (Snodgrass and
Corwin, 1988; Mill and O’Connor, 2014). JoAs and JoPs were
quantified as a percentage of the VAS scale. Mean d’, JoAs and
JoPs were submitted to repeated measures ANOVAs, with the
factors masking (unmasked vs. masked) and turbulence (no
turbulence vs. turbulence).
Additionally, we assessed whether any effects of visual
masking on JoAs could be explained by a reduction in JoPs.
For this, a hierarchical linear regression model (also known
as linear mixed-effects models) was used to model single-
trial level data. JoAs were modeled by the factors masking
and turbulence (coded as unmasked = 0, masked = 1; no
turbulence = 0, turbulence = 1), as well as their interaction.
JoPs were added as a covariate, after standardizing within
participants, as we predicted that JoPs would inform JoAs
across conditions. All fixed effects were also allowed vary
between participants (i.e., participant random intercepts
and slopes). This analysis was conducted using the lme4
package (Bates et al., 2014) in R (R Core Team, 2015).
Parameter estimates (b) and their associated t-tests (t, p),
calculated using the Satterthwaite approximation for degrees of
freedom (Kuznetsova et al., 2015), are presented to show the
magnitude of the effects, with bootstrapped 95% confidence
intervals.
Results
Analysis of d’ showed that discrimination between targets
and distractors was significantly lower for masked, relative
to unmasked, trials [mean difference = 0.12, SD = 0.15,
F(1,22) = 13.67, p= 0.001, η2p = 0.38; see Figure 2A]. Turbulence
also led to a significant reduction in d’, relative to no turbulence
trials [mean difference = 0.89, SD = 0.25, F(1,22) = 302.66,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.93]. There was no significant interaction
between the factors [F(1,22) = 0.91, p= 0.35, η2p = 0.040].
Similarly, JoPs were significantly lower for masked, relative
to unmasked, trials [mean difference = 4.60%, SD = 4.73,
F(1,22) = 20.66, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.48; see Figure 2B]. Turbulence
also led to a significant reduction in JoPs, relative to no turbulence
trials [mean difference = 32.67%, SD = 17.96, F(1,22) = 75.83,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.78]. There was a marginally significant
interaction between the factors [F(1,22) = 3.53, p = 0.074,
η2p = 0.14].
Results for JoAs (see Figure 2C) showed a significant
reduction for masked, relative to unmasked, trials [mean
difference = 6.13%, SD = 5.39, F(1,22) = 28.52, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.57]. Turbulence also led to a significant reduction in
JoAs, relative to no turbulence trials [mean difference = 49.58%,
SD = 18.67, F(1,22) = 161.65, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.88].
Moreover, there was a significant interaction between the
factors [F(1,22) = 5.81, p = 0.025, η2p = 0.21]. Simple effects
t-tests showed that, for no turbulence trials, masking led to
a significant reduction in JoAs [mean difference = 9.48%,
SD = 10.65, t(22) = 4.27, p < 0.001, dz = 0.89]; whereas
this reduction was only marginally significant for turbulence
trials [mean difference = 2.65%, SD = 6.19, t(22) = 2.05,
p = 0.053, dz = 0.43]. Turbulence had a significant effect in
both masking conditions (unmasked: mean difference= 52.97%,
SD = 19.91, t(22) = 12.76, p < 0.001, dz = 2.66; masked: mean
difference = 46.14%, SD = 19.87, t(22) = 11.14, p < 0.001,
dz = 2.32).
Finally, we assessed whether the effect of masking on JoAs
could be accounted for by changes in JoPs. Previous studies
(e.g., Metcalfe et al., 2013) showed that perceived performance
is used as cue to agency, predicting a general, positive relation
between JoPs and JoAs. Therefore, JoAs were modeled by the
experimental factors, and JoPs (standardized) were entered as
a covariate (see Figure 2D and Supplementary Table 1). The
results revealed that JoPs were positively related to JoAs (b= 0.12,
t(22.56) = 6.39, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.09, 0.16]), as predicted.
Importantly, masking remained a significant predictor of JoAs
(b = −0.05, t(21.53) = −2.98, p = 0.007, 95% CI = [−0.08,
−0.02]), as did turbulence (b = −0.34, t(20.27) = −8.80,
p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.41, −0.26]). The interaction
between masking and turbulence was no longer significant
(b= 0.03, t(51.91) = 1.48, p= 0.14, 95% CI= [−0.01, 0.08]).
Discussion
In Experiment 1, visual masking was used to disrupt the
processing fluency of the stimuli that drove participants’ actions.
This, in turn, disrupted the fluency of action selection, as it made
the process of deciding which action to make, i.e., where to move
the cursor, more difficult. The results showed that visual masking
disrupted both objective and subjective measures of performance,
as expected. Moreover, visual masking led to a reduction in
JoAs, which could not be explained by perceived differences in
performance, due to increased task difficulty. That is, the mere
disruption of processing fluency led to a loss of agency.
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FIGURE 2 | Results of Experiment 1. Effects of masking and turbulence on mean d’ (A), JoPs (B), and JoAs (C). No Turb, no turbulence; Turb, turbulence. Error
bars show the standard error of the mean. (D) Parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals, for modeling JoAs by the factors masking and
turbulence, and by JoPs (within-participants Z-score).
These results are consistent with research showing that fluency
can affect a number of metacognitive judgements (see Alter and
Oppenheimer, 2009 for a review). Moreover, previous studies
have shown that dysfluent action selection is associated with a
reduction in the sense of agency (Chambon et al., 2014b). These
studies used response conflict to manipulate the fluency of action
selection. Here, we show that disrupting action selection at the
early stage of stimulus processing can lead to a reduction in the
sense of agency.
In addition to visual processing, we manipulated whether
the consequences of one’s actions matched one’s intentions,
by introducing a discrepancy between the movement of the
mouse and the movement of the cursor, termed turbulence.
When the cursor on the screen did not accurately track the
mouse’s movements, there was a reduction in both objective and
subjective measures of performance, as well as a large reduction
in JoAs. This reduction in JoAs was independent of differences
in JoPs, and was larger than the effect of turbulence on JoPs.
These findings replicate previous studies that used a similar
manipulation (e.g., Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Metcalfe et al.,
2013).
Finally, while discrimination performance reflected
additive effects of the visual masking and mouse turbulence
manipulations, the effects of these factors on metacognitive
judgements of agency were partially underadditive. This
underadditivity can be seen in the significant interaction
between visual masking and turbulence effects on average JoAs.
Overall, visual masking had a minor effect on JoAs compared
to the effect of turbulence. Additionally, we found that visual
processing dysfluency especially disrupted the sense of agency
when the cursor accurately followed the movements of the
mouse, but less so when turbulence was introduced. On the other
hand, turbulence had a large and robust effect across masking
conditions. The larger effect of turbulence on performance
suggests that it may have been a more salient cue for agency
than visual processing fluency. The greater saliency of discrepant
action feedback resulted in very low JoAs, i.e., a floor effect,
which in turn obscured the effects of processing fluency on
JoAs observed under accurate action feedback. In fact, average
JoPs also showed a somewhat underadditive effect of the two
manipulations, possibly denoting that turbulence was a stronger
cue for both metacognitive judgements.
Nonetheless, the interaction between masking and turbulence
on JoAs was no longer significant after accounting for differences
in JoPs, in a multi-level regression model. We may speculate
that the apparent underadditive effect is due to the difference
in the size of the effects of masking and turbulence on
JoAs. Future studies should attempt to balance the effects of
masking and turbulence on performance, to clarify whether these
underadditive effects on metacognitive judgements are linked to
differences in the salience of the two manipulations. One may
speculate that they are not, given that mouse turbulence is a
reliable and direct indicator of a loss of agency. Participants
were less able to implement their intended actions, and thus had
objectively less control over the game. Visual masking only made
action selection more difficult, but did not interfere with the
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ability to interact with the game. Alternatively, selection fluency
may have a general effect on JoAs, consistent with other work
on the effects fluency on metacognitive and affective judgements
(Alter and Oppenheimer, 2009).
EXPERIMENT 2
This experiment aimed to investigate whether the ease, or
difficulty, of classifying stimuli as targets for action would
influence sense of agency, by varying stimulus ambiguity.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Procedures were as described above. Twenty-four new Columbia
University or Barnard College students (10 female, mean
age = 20.79, SD = 2.93) volunteered to participate for course
credit, and gave written informed consent. Five participants were
left-handed, and the remaining were right-handed.
Apparatus
The basic setup was as in Experiment 1, except for the following.
The target and distractor items now consisted of 6 gray circles,
of 3 lighter and 3 darker shades relative to half gray (roughly 65,
90, 115, 140, 165, and 190 on a 255 RGB scale). The horizontal
bar was now white, and the box controlled by the participant
was black. The number of items at the start of the trial was
reduced to six targets and six distractors, in order to increase
overall performance. The turbulence manipulation was adjusted
to double the period of the sine wave (by dividing 2pi t by 4.8,
instead of 2.4). This slowed down the rate at which the direction
of the noise component added to the mouse’s movement changed,
thus making the mouse more controllable than in Experiment 1.
Design and Procedure
The main design and procedures were as in previous experiments.
Instead of letters, the items consisted of gray circles. Participants
were instructed to catch all the light gray circles, i.e., the
targets, but to avoid the dark gray circles, i.e., the distractors
(counterbalanced). Here, action selection was manipulated by
varying the ambiguity in categorizing items as targets or
distractors. There were six equally spaced shades of gray, bisected
by the half gray tone (see Figure 3A). Thus, there were three levels
of ambiguity in the gray shades, depending on the distance from
half gray. The two shades at the extremes of the range were easy
to categorize as light or dark, whereas the two shades closest to
half gray were highly ambiguous.
Ambiguity was manipulated across trials (i.e., games), by
varying the proportions of more and less ambiguous shades (see
Figure 3B). In the low ambiguity condition, most items were
drawn from the extremes of the range. Thus, each trial started
with three extreme, two medium, and one very ambiguous shade,
both for targets and distractors. In the high ambiguity condition,
most of the items were drawn from the highly ambiguous end
of the range. Each trial started with one extreme, two medium,
and three very ambiguous shades of targets and of distractors. As
before, turbulence was also manipulated across trials. As before,
FIGURE 3 | Schematic of stimuli in Experiment 2. (A) The six graded
shades of gray used. The first three stimuli were classed as light gray, whereas
the last three were classed as dark gray. (B) The two ambiguity conditions,
which differed in their proportions of extreme and ambiguous gray shades.
Stimulus size and colors have been adapted.
the four resulting conditions were quasi-randomized, across six
blocks. Participants played the game for 30 s, and then gave JoAs,
and JoPs.
During training, participants were shown the three shades of
gray to class as targets, and the three shades to class as distractors.
There were two practice games, both followed by JoAs and JoPs.
Data Analysis
Mean d’, JoPs and JoAs were submitted to repeated measures
ANOVAs with the factors ambiguity (low vs. high) and
turbulence (no turbulence vs. turbulence). Simple effects
t-tests were used to probe interaction between ambiguity and
turbulence.
To characterize participants’ strategies, the response bias (c)
measure from signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966)
was used, with a correction for zero false alarms (Snodgrass
and Corwin, 1988; Mill and O’Connor, 2014). Zero reflects an
unbiased criterion, negative values reflect a liberal criterion, and
positive values denote a conservative criterion. Essentially, here,
a larger positive criterion would be associated with a lower
number of items caught (targets or distractors), i.e., more careful
responding. This bias measure was computed for each trial, and
then averaged for each participant (collapsing across conditions).
Similarly to the previous experiments, JoAs were modeled by
the independent variables and by JoPs. Ambiguity was coded as
low = 0, high = 1. Additionally, average bias (c) was included
as a between-participant (mean centered) covariate, as was the
interaction between ambiguity and average bias.
Results
Discrimination between targets and distractors (d’) was
significantly reduced by high ambiguity, relative to low
ambiguity [mean difference = 0.45, SD = 0.20, F(1,23) = 116.00,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.84; see Figure 4A]. Turbulence also led to
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FIGURE 4 | Results of Experiment 2. Effects of ambiguity and turbulence on mean d’ (A), JoPs (B), and JoAs (C). No Turb, no turbulence; Turb, turbulence. Error
bars show the standard error of the mean. (D) Parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals, for modeling JoAs by the independent variables,
JoPs (Z-score, within participants), and average bias (centered, between participants). (E) Average JoAs across participants (points) and model predictions
(regression line, and shaded 95% prediction intervals) for the relation between the effect of stimulus ambiguity on JoAs and participants’ average response bias.
Participants with a larger bias had a more conservative response criterion. Predictions were obtained from 10,000 simulations from the posterior distribution of
plausible parameter values under uniform priors (Gelman and Su, 2015).
significantly lower d’ scores, relative to no turbulence [mean
difference = 0.55, SD = 0.14, F(1,23) = 362.92, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.94]. There was no significant interaction between the
factors [F(1,23) = 1.57, p= 0.22, η2p = 0.064].
High ambiguity led to a significant reduction in JoPs, relative
to low ambiguity [mean difference = 3.04%, SD = 5.04,
F(1,23) = 8.73, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.28; see Figure 4B]. Turbulence
also led to significantly lower JoPs than no turbulence [mean
difference = 12.77%, SD = 8.32, F(1,23) = 56.62, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.71]. There was no significant interaction between the
factors [F(1,23) = 1.51, p= 0.23, η2p = 0.062].
Analysis of mean JoAs showed no significant main effect of
ambiguity [F(1,23) = 1.36, p = 0.26, η2p = 0.056]. Turbulence
led to lower significantly JoAs than no turbulence [mean
difference = 37.91%, SD = 16.72, F(1,23) = 123.33, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.84]. Moreover, there was a significant interaction between
ambiguity and turbulence [F(1,23) = 5.55, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.19;
see Figure 4C]. Simple effects t-tests revealed that high ambiguity
led to a significant reduction in JoAs relative to low ambiguity
in no turbulence trials (mean difference = 3.28%, SD = 6.86,
t(23) = 2.35, p = 0.028, dz = 0.48), but there was no effect
of ambiguity in turbulence trials [mean difference = −0.71%,
SD= 6.78, t(23)=−0.52, p= 0.61, dz =−0.11]. Turbulence led to
a significant reduction in JoAs in both ambiguity conditions [low
ambiguity: mean difference = 39.90%, SD = 17.26, t(23) = 11.33,
p < 0.001, dz = 2.31; high ambiguity: mean difference= 35.91%,
SD= 17.20, t(23) = 10.23, p < 0.001, dz = 2.09].
Importantly, in this experiment, the ambiguity manipulation –
varying the proportions of more and less ambiguous items –
was relatively subtle. Therefore, participants’ sensitivity to the
difference between ambiguity conditions, and its effect on JoAs,
could depend on the strategy participants employed while playing
the game. Some might try to maximize their hits by catching
many items, while risking a larger number of false alarms. Others
might be very wary of false alarms, and thus focus on catching the
least ambiguous items, even though they reduced their number
of hits. One hypothesis would be that participants making risky
choices would be more affected by the ambiguity manipulation,
because they would make more uncertain decisions, i.e., deciding
to catch an item that they were uncertain about, with higher
ambiguity. On the other hand, more careful participants could
be more affected by the manipulation because they would be
more sensitive to the overall increased uncertainty in the decision
process, i.e., deciding which items to catch, in the high ambiguity
condition. These strategies were captured as the average response
bias (Green and Swets, 1966) of each participant, with larger
(positive) values indicating more careful responding.
Therefore, in addition to assessing whether the effect of
ambiguity on JoAs, could be accounted for by changes in JoPs,
as in previous experiments, we assessed whether it was related
to participants’ average bias. For this, we added average bias,
and its interaction with ambiguity, to the previously used model.
As before, results showed a positive relation between JoPs and
JoAs (b = 0.05, t(22.56) = 7.34, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.04,
0.07]), and a significant effect of turbulence (b = −0.35,
t(23.38) = −9.83, p < 0.001, 95% CI = [−0.42, −0.28]; see
Figure 4D and Supplementary Table 2). Consistent with the
ANOVA results, the main effect of ambiguity was not significant
(b=−0.02, t(196.38) =−1.26, p= 0.21, 95% CI= [−0.05, 0.01]).
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However, the ambiguity by turbulence interaction, which was
significant in the ANOVA, was no longer significant in this model
(b = 0.03, t(390.40) = 1.60, p = 0.11, 95% CI = [−0.01, 0.08]).
Participants’ average bias was not significantly related to JoAs
overall (b = 0.17, t(22.82) = 1.48, p = 0.15, 95% CI = [−0.05,
0.43]), but more importantly, there was a significant interaction
between ambiguity and average bias (b=−0.16, t(194.37)=−2.60,
p= 0.01, 95% CI= [−0.29,−0.03]). Model predictions, displayed
in Figure 4E, showed that participants with a larger average
bias, that is, with more conservative responding, showed a larger
ambiguity effect. [For exploratory analyses of how response bias
was affected by our experimental manipulations, at the within-
participant level and across experiments, see Supplementary
Analyses in Data Sheet 1.]
Discussion
The present experiment investigated the effect of uncertainty in
action selection on the sense of agency by manipulating stimulus
ambiguity. In Experiment 1, once stimuli were identified amidst
the noise mask, it was clear whether they were a target or a
distractor. In contrast, items were easy to detect here, but there
was uncertainty about the categorization of highly ambiguous
stimuli. Results showed that objective and subjective measures
of performance were reduced by greater stimulus ambiguity,
and by the turbulence manipulation. Average JoAs were also
reduced by turbulence, but were only affected by stimulus
ambiguity in the condition without turbulence. That is, when
the cursor accurately followed the mouse’s movements, greater
stimulus ambiguity led to a decrease in JoAs, but there was no
difference in JoAs when the mouse and cursor movements were
discrepant.
In line with the previous experiment, these findings support
the proposal that metacognitive signals about action selection
can influence the sense of agency (Chambon et al., 2014b). They
further extend previous research by showing that uncertainty
about the correct response to a stimulus can lead to a loss
of agency. Interestingly, stimulus ambiguity reduces confidence
judgements (Boldt and Yeung, 2015), suggesting there may be
overlap in the signals that inform both types of metacognitive
judgements.
The discrepancy between intended and observed movements,
induced by mouse turbulence, again had a larger effect on
JoAs than the visual manipulation (in this case, ambiguity),
and, in fact, abolished stimulus ambiguity effects. A similar
interaction between masking and turbulence was found in
Experiment 1. The turbulence manipulation was attenuated
in the present experiment, and its effect on performance
was more similar in size to the effect of ambiguity, relative
to the difference between the effects of turbulence and
masking in Experiment 1. However, the increased overall
difficulty of this task, even in the “low ambiguity” condition,
may have led to weaker ambiguity effects on metacognitive
judgements, as the difference between conditions was less
clear.
Furthermore, this experiment allowed participants to use
different strategies in playing the game. Some might risk making
uncertain decisions, by catching the more ambiguous items,
even though they could be distractors. Others might avoid
making such risky decisions, and limit themselves to catching
the less ambiguous items. To account for these differences in
strategies across participants, we included a measure of the
average response bias of participants when modeling JoAs. On
the one hand, stimulus ambiguity might particularly affect the
sense of agency when one makes more uncertain decisions. In
this case, participants who made more uncertain decisions, i.e.,
those with a lower response bias, would presumably be more
sensitive to the ambiguity manipulation. At the same time, these
risky participants might have been less concerned with whether
they caught a target or distractor. On the other hand, stimulus
ambiguity might have affected the sense of agency by making
the task more difficult, since there were fewer easy-to-categorize
items in the high ambiguity condition. Then, participants who
restricted themselves to making more certain decisions, i.e., those
with a higher response bias, would have been more affected by the
ambiguity manipulation.
Modeling results showed that the interaction between
ambiguity and turbulence found for average JoAs may be
partly explained by differences in JoPs. Additionally, there was
a significant interaction between ambiguity and participants’
average response bias, which was independent of JoPs. This
showed that stimulus ambiguity had a larger effect on JoAs
in participants who had a more conservative criterion for
responding, or a more positive bias, relative to less conservative
participants. Participants who restricted themselves to catching
those stimuli that were unambiguously identifiable as targets
were most affected by the ambiguity manipulation. In the
high ambiguity condition there were fewer unambiguous items,
therefore the task was more difficult.
This could also reflect an overall effect of action frequency
on sense of agency: conservative participants who required
unambiguous evidence to identify targets for action would make
relatively fewer actions during the game, especially in the high
ambiguity condition. They would therefore feel a reduced sense
of agency, compared to less conservative participants who made
more actions. Interestingly, the interaction pattern observed in
Figure 4E shows little difference in JoAs across participants for
the high ambiguity condition. Instead, it suggests that it was
more conservative participants who showed an increase in JoAs
in the low ambiguity condition. Perhaps these participants felt
especially certain of their decisions in this condition, whereas
liberal participants who made more risky decisions always
felt highly uncertain about their decisions, regardless of the
ambiguity condition.
These results suggest that participants’ JoAs were especially
sensitive to the contextual effect of stimulus ambiguity on task
difficulty, i.e., whether it was easier or harder to identify targets. It
remains unclear how uncertainty in a specific decision influences
the sense of agency, since the dynamic nature of the game allowed
participants to avoid making more uncertain decisions. Yet, in
everyday life, there are many situations in which one cannot avoid
making a decision, even when one is uncertain. Thus, it could still
be hypothesized that, under conditions where avoiding a decision
is not possible, uncertainty about the action could influence the
sense of agency.
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EXPERIMENT 3
This experiment tested the effect of response conflict on the
sense of agency, by adding task-relevant flankers to target and
distractor stimuli.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Procedures were as described above. Twenty-three new Columbia
University or Barnard College students (18 female, mean
age = 23.87, SD = 4.87) volunteered to participate for course
credit, and gave written informed consent. Three participants
were left-handed, one was ambidextrous, and the remaining were
right-handed. One participant was excluded due to extremely low
JoPs and JoAs (>2 SD below the mean, across conditions), and
very low performance in the condition with no disruptions (full
congruency and no turbulence: d’ was 2 SDs below the mean).
Apparatus
The main apparatus was as in Experiment 2, except for the targets
and distractors. Groups of three letters, consisting of Ms and Cs,
were presented in white on a black background. Groups with a
target letter in the central position were defined as target groups,
and groups with a distractor letter in the central position were
defined as distractor groups. Each trial started with six target
groups and six distractor groups.
Design and Procedure
The design and procedure were as in previous experiments,
except for the following changes. In the present experiment,
Ms and Cs were presented as targets and distractors
(counterbalanced). To manipulate action selection, flanker
letters were added to the target and distractor items, in order
to induce response conflict when flankers were incongruent
with the middle letter (e.g., CMC). Items always consisted of
three-letter groups, but participants were instructed to focus on
the middle letter. Only the central letter counted as a target or
distractor, and participants had to touch the central letter with
the mouse cursor (white box) in order to catch it. Touching only
the outer letters did not count as a catch. Therefore, the flanker
letters should be ignored. As before, participants played the game
for 30 s, and then gave JoAs and JoPs. Instructions were adapted
for the present manipulation.
Flanker congruency was manipulated across three conditions
(see Figure 5). In the full congruency condition, all items were
surrounded by congruent flankers (i.e., always MMM and CCC).
In the high congruency condition, two-thirds of the items were
congruent, but the other third was incongruent (i.e., CMC and
MCM). Finally, in the low congruency condition, only one-
third of the items was congruent, and the other two-thirds were
incongruent. Additionally, turbulence was manipulated across
trials, as in Experiment 2. This 3 × 2 factorial design resulted in
six conditions, which were quasi-randomized across six blocks, as
before.
During training, participants first started by playing a game
with full flanker congruency, and practiced JoAs and JoPs.
Once confident with this condition, they were introduced to the
incongruently flanked items, and played another practice game
with high flanker congruency, followed by JoAs and JoPs. They
were given the chance to practice further, if required.
Data Analysis
Mean d’, JoPs and JoAs were submitted to repeated measures
ANOVAs with the factors flanker congruency (full vs. high vs.
low) and turbulence (no turbulence vs. turbulence). Planned
comparisons were used to probe the main effect of congruency.
Additionally, JoAs were modeled by the experimental factors and
by JoPs, as in Experiment 1, except for the coding of congruency.
The three-level factor congruency resulted in two contrasts, with
full congruency as a baseline condition (i.e., full vs. high and full
vs. low).
Results
Discrimination between targets and distractors (d’) was
significantly affected by flanker congruency [F(2,42) = 105.41,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.83; see Figure 6A]. High congruency led to a
significant reduction in performance, relative to full congruency
(full – high: mean = 0.30, SD = 0.14), and low congruency led
to a further significant reduction relative to high (high – low:
mean= 0.23, SD= 0.19; all comparisons p < 0.001). Turbulence
led to a significant reduction in performance, relative to no
turbulence [mean difference = 0.72, SD = 0.21, F(1,22) = 253.70,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.92]. There was no significant interaction
between the factors [F(2,42) = 0.23, p= 0.80, η2p = 0.011].
Analyses of JoPs showed a significant effect of flanker
congruency [F(2,42) = 31.36, p= 0.001, η2p = 0.60; see Figure 6B].
Relative to full congruency, high congruency led to a significant
reduction in JoPs (full – high: mean = 5.87%, SD = 5.16,
p < 0.001), and there was a further reduction in JoPs for
low congruency, relative to high (high – low: mean = 2.27%,
SD = 4.99, p = 0.042). Turbulence led to a significant reduction
in JoPs, relative to no turbulence [mean difference = 16.61%,
SD= 11.14, F(1,22)= 48.49, p< 0.001, η2p= 0.70]. The interaction
between the factors was not significant [F(2,42) = 0.86, p = 0.39,
η2p = 0.039, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected].
Flanker congruency also influenced JoAs significantly
[F(2,42) = 19.91, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.49; see Figure 6C]. JoAs
were significantly lower in the high and low congruency
conditions, relative to full congruency (full – high:
mean = 5.39%, SD = 4.80; full – low: mean = 6.66%,
SD = 4.69; ps < 0.001). JoAs did not differ between high
and low congruency conditions (high – low: mean = 1.27%,
SD = 6.12; p = 0.33). Turbulence led to a reduction in
JoAs, relative to no turbulence [mean difference = 31.48%,
SD = 21.00, F(1,22) = 49.19, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.70].
The interaction between the factors was not significant
[F(2,42) = 0.71, p = 0.47, η2p = 0.033, Greenhouse-Geisser
corrected].
Modeling JoAs with JoPs as a covariate (see Figure 6D
and Supplementary Table 3) again showed a significant positive
relation between JoPs and JoAs (b = 0.10, t(21.15) = 7.90,
p < 0.001, 95% CI = [0.08, 0.13]), and turbulence remained
a significant predictor of JoAs (b = −0.22, t(20.71) = −4.98,
p < 0.001, 95% CI= [−0.31,−0.13]). The contrast between full
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FIGURE 5 | Schematic of stimuli in Experiment 3. Stimulus size has been adapted, and colors have been inverted.
FIGURE 6 | Results of Experiment 3. Effects of flanker congruency and turbulence on mean d’ (A), JoPs (B), and JoAs (C). No Turb, no turbulence; Turb,
turbulence. Error bars show the standard error of the mean. (D) Parameter estimates, with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals, for modeling JoAs by the
independent variables and by JoPs (Z-score, within participants).
and high congruency was not a significant predictor of JoAs
(b = −0.03, t(60.60) = −1.65, p = 0.10, 95% CI = [−0.06,
0.00]), and neither was the full vs. low congruency contrast
(b = −0.01, t(57.39) = −0.55, p = 0.58, 95% CI= [−0.04, 0.02]).
This shows that the effects of flanker congruency on JoAs could
be largely explained by changes in JoPs. There were no significant
interactions between the congruency contrasts and turbulence
(full vs. high × turbulence: b = 0.01, t(53.87) = 0.69, p = 0.49,
95% CI = [−0.03, 0.06]; full vs. low × turbulence: b = −0.02,
t(111.32) =−0.83, p= 0.41, 95% CI= [−0.06, 0.03]).
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Discussion
In Experiment 3, action selection fluency was manipulated
by varying the congruency between flankers and targets or
distractors. Incongruent flankers were used to induce response
conflict, as one might be mistakenly drawn toward a distractor
or away from a target. Results showed that, indeed, flanker
congruency affected both objective and subjective measures of
performance. Additionally, and consistent with previous findings
(Sidarus and Haggard, 2016), flanker congruency influenced
metacognitive judgements of agency. Parametrically reducing
the proportion of congruent flankers led to a gradual reduction
in performance. JoPs also showed a gradual reduction in
performance, but with a larger reduction when comparing full
and high congruency, relative to comparing high and low
congruency. This confirms that the presence of incongruent
flankers led to an impairment in performance. Moreover, it
suggests that, the presence of incongruent flankers was more
salient than their proportion at a metacognitive level.
In fact, the results showed that average JoAs were only
sensitive to the presence or absence of incongruent flankers.
Relative to full congruency, both high and low congruency
conditions led to a significant reduction in JoAs, but there was no
difference between high and low congruency. The mere presence
of some incongruent flankers was sufficient to disrupt the sense
of agency, independently of the proportion of incongruent to
congruent flankers, and thus independently of the precise degree
of task difficulty they caused. Previous studies already showed
that the influence of response conflict on the sense of agency was
independent of RTs, which is typically considered an index of
difficulty of each particular trial (Chambon and Haggard, 2012;
Sidarus and Haggard, 2016). Furthermore, previous studies using
a similar game have shown that, while JoAs are sensitive to the
presence of discrepancy between the mouse’s movements and
visual feedback, they are not particularly sensitive to the degree
of that discrepancy (Metcalfe et al., 2010, 2012; Zalla et al., 2015).
Thus, sense of agency is highly sensitive to any disruption of
intentional action, but does not track in detail the degree of
disruption.
These results are consistent with the view that a positive
sense of agency may be a “default” state, and it is when the
normal flow from intention to action to outcome is disrupted
that the sense of agency is reduced (Chambon et al., 2014b).
Relative to the default state (in this case, the full congruency/no
turbulence condition), any disruption is quite salient, whereas
the degree of disruption may be less important. When any part
of the stimulus-action-outcome processing chain is disrupted,
the sense of agency may be reduced. However, details about
the disruption that informs metacognitive judgements of agency
can be somewhat unspecific, not only about the locus of
the disruption, but also about the degree of the disruption.
Indeed, fluency/conflict signals are known to often be vague
and unspecific in content, and can affect other metacognitive
judgements (Winkielman et al., 2015).
As predicted, turbulence once again led to a large reduction
in JoAs, which was greater than the effect of introducing
incongruent flankers. Unlike Experiments 1 and 2, in which
manipulations of action selection interacted with turbulence,
there was no significant congruency by turbulence interaction
for JoAs. As can be seen in Figure 6, there was a clear
additive effect of the two manipulations on performance, and
to some extent on JoPs, but the pattern was less clear for JoAs.
Nevertheless, turbulence seemed to be a more important cue to
agency.
Finally, modeling of JoAs revealed that they were only
predicted significantly by JoPs and turbulence condition. This
suggests that changes in JoPs accounted for a large part of the
congruency effects on JoAs. While this might seem to imply
that flanker congruency, and thus that response conflict does
not have an effect on the sense of agency independently of
performance monitoring, this conclusion would be premature.
Previous studies have shown that response conflict leads to a
reduction in the sense of agency, independently of monitoring
the external consequences of the action (e.g., the appearance
of a colored circle; cf. Chambon et al., 2014b; Sidarus and
Haggard, 2016), as well as monitoring performance in terms of
RTs (Chambon and Haggard, 2012; Sidarus and Haggard, 2016).
Whereas the aforementioned studies mostly measured the
sense of agency after each fluent or dysfluent action, the
present experiment involved a dynamic interaction with
varying proportions of congruent/incongruent flankers, and
thus assessed a more global experience of fluency vs. conflict,
after the participant made several different actions in the
game. The present experiment shows, as “proof of concept,”
that an accumulated experience of conflict can influence the
metacognition of agency. This is consistent with studies which
obtained agency ratings at the end of a block, and showed that
experiences of fluency or conflict became associated with specific
action outcomes (Wenke et al., 2010; Sidarus and Haggard, 2016).
Nonetheless, further research is needed to explore a possible
dissociation between the effects of conflict on JoAs and JoPs.
For example, the use of three congruency levels here could
have led to an overall reduction in the congruency effect on
JoAs, relative to an experiment comparing only full and high
congruency conditions. The frequent exposure to incongruent
flankers, due to the inclusion of both high and low congruency
conditions, could have weakened the required stimulus-response
association (i.e., catch Ms and avoid Os). This would, in turn,
have weakened the conflict triggered by incongruent flankers, and
thus reduced their impact on JoAs. We may therefore speculate
that reinforcing the standard stimulus-response mapping by
increasing the prevalence of congruent flankers could yield a
greater effect of response conflict on the sense of agency.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Previous psychological research emphasized how sense of agency
depends on a process of comparing the predicted and actual
consequences of actions. This tradition of research has been
largely based on explicit judgements of whether a specific
outcome did or did not match one’s own actions. Thus, our
focus on action selection represents a novel theoretical departure
for sense of agency research (cf. Chambon et al., 2014b).
The present research goes beyond previous studies in three
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important ways. First, we investigated the contribution of action
selection processes to the sense of agency, in contrast to the
traditional emphasis on outcomes. Second, we investigated the
sense of agency while acting in a dynamic environment requiring
continuous coordination between visual input and motor output.
This allowed us to study sense of agency in a rich, ecological
context, which emphasized fluent control of performance, as
opposed to discrete matching of events. Finally, previous work
on the role of action selection to the sense of agency had
so far only employed response conflict tasks (Chambon et al.,
2014b; Sidarus and Haggard, 2016). We extended this work by
using different manipulations of action selection, across three
experiments: stimulus processing fluency, stimulus ambiguity,
and response conflict.
We consistently found that disrupting action selection
processes led to reductions in JoAs. These novel manipulations,
applied in a dynamic environment, reveal the robustness and
generalisability of the effects of action selection fluency on
agency. Action selection necessarily precedes action itself, and
also precedes action outcomes. Thus, our results show that
prospective cues, based on action selection, contribute to sense
of agency.
Our view complements the dominant emphasis on the role
of retrospective monitoring of outcomes in sense of agency. In
particular, we showed how prospective cues are integrated with
retrospective cues to agency, based on proximal outcomes. For
this, we combined manipulations of action selection with the
classical discrepancy between movements and visual feedback
used to disrupt retrospective processing. Discrepancy led to a
loss of agency, in accordance with previous studies (Metcalfe and
Greene, 2007; Farrer et al., 2008; Metcalfe et al., 2010, 2013).
Across all experiments, discrepancy remained the predominant
cue to agency. The effects of action selection on sense of
agency were dramatically reduced when discrepancy was also
present. That is, when the cursor accurately followed the mouse’s
movements, action selection made a larger contribution to JoAs
than when the cursor was perturbed. This interaction was
most marked when action selection processing was manipulated
through visual processing fluency and stimulus ambiguity factors.
Unlike other agency studies (e.g., Haggard et al., 2002), the
continuous and rich context of our task allowed us to measure
performance, i.e., achieving the goal of catching Xs. We also
asked participants to make judgements of their own performance.
Discrepant visual feedback affected performance and JoPs more
strongly than did our manipulations of action selection. These
strong effects of discrepancy on performance could explain why
effects of action selection on JoAs were small compared to effects
of discrepancy. This could also explain the weaker effects of
action selection on JoAs when visual feedback was discrepant, as
discrepancy already led to floor effects on JoAs.
The present findings appear to contrast, however, with a
previous study that showed action selection fluency had a
larger effect on the sense of agency when outcomes violated
expectations (Sidarus et al., 2013). However, that study required
participants to judge distal outcomes of actions (colored
circles), whereas we manipulated proximal outcomes here.
Furthermore, as those distal outcomes were mostly predictable
(67% contingency), the occasional violation of expectations
was not a reliable indicator of loss of agency. Under such
circumstances, relying on internal cues to agency would
compensate for the expected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005)
of the external environment. On the other hand, the present
study found that discrepancy between the mouse and cursor
movements (a proximal outcome) did reliably indicate a loss
of agency, as participants had objectively less control over the
game. While the manipulations of action selection made the game
more or less difficult to play, they did not affect participants’
objective ability to control the game. Previous studies showed
that sense of agency is more sensitive to disruption of the relation
between movement and proximal outcomes than to disruption
of the relation between movement and distal outcomes (Metcalfe
et al., 2013). The present results emphasize the predominance
of proximal outcomes, by showing that proximal outcomes may
overshadow effects of action selection on sense of agency.
Finally, as manipulations of action selection can also affect
task performance, we tested whether effects on JoAs could be
partially accounted for by changes in subjective evaluations
of performance (i.e., JoPs). As seen in previous studies (e.g.,
Metcalfe and Greene, 2007; Metcalfe et al., 2013), JoPs were
positively related to JoAs, and the effects of discrepant visual
feedback on JoAs could not be accounted for by JoPs across
all three experiments. Regarding action selection, in Experiment
1, visual processing fluency had an effect on JoAs that was
independent of changes in JoPs. In Experiment 2, we additionally
considered the behavioral strategies of participants in playing the
game, and found that the effect of stimulus ambiguity on more
cautious, conservative participants was not fully accounted for by
JoPs. However, in Experiment 3, the effects of response conflict
on JoAs appeared to be largely explained by JoPs. Notably, the
weaker effects of the action selection manipulations on JoAs in
Experiments 2 and 3 may have allowed for a greater influence of
JoPs.
Our major conclusion, therefore, is that action selection
processes inform the sense of agency, at least when actions and
their proximal outcomes are consistent. This view highlights
the role of prospective contributions to sense of agency, in
contrast with previous research in the field, which emphasizes
the retrospective matching of outcomes with actions, or with
intentions. Our results suggest that even before we act, the
process of constructing a feeling of agency has already begun.
This prospective sense of agency is thought to serve as an
advance predictor of successful action, and to bridge the interval
between action and outcome (Chambon et al., 2014b). The
results described here confirm the role of this cue in the
sense of agency, while consistently showing that the actual
statistical relation between action and (proximal) outcome
remains the most important cue. This relative weighting between
selection processes and proximal outcomes may be important in
estimating control.
A prospective sense of agency based on action selection is, of
course, not a veridical perception of the actual degree of control.
The true degree of control a participant has in the task refers to
the relation between their motor action and the movement of the
cursor on the screen. That is, the processes that lead participants
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to choose how to act are independent of the effect that their
action, once they actually make it, will have in the task. Thus,
the fluency or difficulty of action selection gives only an estimate
of true statistical control. In general, this estimate is a reliable
heuristic for control: when one clearly and easily knows which
action to make to achieve a goal, this will generally be because the
relation between actions and goals is stable, and the goal can be
successfully achieved.
The view that sense of agency is an illusion has recently been
popular in psychology (Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Wegner and
Wheatley, 1999). When outcomes match expectations, people
typically have a strong sense of agency, and thus may be fooled
into feeling in control, even when their action has not in fact
produced the outcome, or when they have made no action at
all (Wegner and Wheatley, 1999; Wegner et al., 2004). However,
this view fails to account for why we may sometimes achieve our
desired goal, and yet still feel like we are not fully in control. For
example, suppose a person who has never played darts before
hits the bull’s eye at the first throw. Even though the desired
goal was obtained (hitting the bull’s eye), that person will likely
not feel fully in control of that outcome. Rather, the agent might
partially attribute the outcome to some “beginner’s luck,” and
thus experience a reduced sense of agency. The action performed
was not precisely and fluently selected, given the agent’s lack of
expertise in the game. We suggest that the dysfluency in action
selection serves here as an important signal to the agent of a
lack of control over the task. Although the desired outcome was
obtained this time, the lack of expertise with the task, and the
resulting dysfluency in action selection, means the agent feels
she is unlikely to achieve the same outcome next time. Therefore,
signals of fluency or dysfluency, and the varying sense of agency
that accompanies them, can serve to guide future behavior. For
example, someone who feels that their success reflects “beginner’s
luck” may still feel a need for further learning. In order to
optimally estimate control, the sense of agency must integrate
various cues, and their relative contribution, or weights, must
be adaptively changed based on which cues are more reliable
indicators of control, in a particular context (Moore and Fletcher,
2012; Synofzik et al., 2013). In our “beginner’s luck” example, the
beginner may give a low weighting to their (successful) outcome
and a high weighting to the dysfluency of their action selection.
Thus, expertise with a given context may moderate how much the
action- vs. outcome-related cues affect the sense of agency.
Goal-directed action is underpinned by a hierarchical
structure of intentions, actions, and outcomes. To achieve
an overarching goal (distal intentions, in the terminology of
Pacherie, 2008), specific actions (proximal intentions) must be
chosen, and converted into motor plans (motor intentions).
These various levels of the hierarchy must be monitored, and
behavior adjusted as needed, in order to achieve the goal. We
present a schematic model of how this could occur within our
task (see Figure 7). The participant’s goal is to catch Xs. For
this, they have to move the cursor on the screen to the vertical
location of targets. Action selection processes serve to convert the
high level goal into specific manual movements of the computer
mouse. The (dys)fluency of this selection process serves as a first
input into the sense of agency, with dysfluency signals leading
FIGURE 7 | An integrative and hierarchical model of the sense of
agency. Various cues to the sense of agency are integrated, which may arise
from different levels of hierarchies of intentions (converting goals into actions)
and outcomes (proximal vs. distal).
to a reduction in the sense of agency. Next, the movements of
the cursor on the screen (proximal outcomes) must be compared
to the predicted movements (based on the motor commands).
This will provide a second input to agency. For example, any
mismatch due to the experimental manipulation of “turbulence”
will reduce the sense of agency. Finally, once the cursor is
moved to the correct location to intercept the X, the X is
expected to disappear – this is the distal outcome, or goal of
the task. If, however, the X did not disappear when touched (cf.
Metcalfe et al., 2013), this would induce a mismatch between the
expected outcome of intercepting the X, implying a failure to
achieve the (distal) goal of catching Xs. These distal mismatch
signals would also provide a third input to the sense of agency.
Monitoring the different levels of this hierarchy is important both
for determining how the various signals should influence the
sense of agency, as well as for determining whether/how one’s
behavior should be adjusted in order to achieve the desired goal.
Clearly, further research is needed to better understand the
mechanisms and computations underlying cue integration in the
sense of agency. Here, we focused on the role of prospective
cues, and testing the robustness and generalizability of previous
findings. However, it remains unclear whether the different
disruptions of action selection used here would constitute the
same cue, as output of a common action monitoring system, or
whether they might constitute different inputs to the sense of
agency. Suggestively, a recent study into the neural correlates of
prospective cues to agency (Sidarus et al., 2017), which induced
response conflict, found a correlation between the correct-related
negativity (CRN) component of action-locked event-related
potentials (ERPs) and judgements of agency. A similar relation
has been reported between the CRN and confidence judgements
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in tasks which varied processing fluency (Scheffers and Coles,
2000) and discrimination difficulty (Boldt and Yeung, 2015).
Future studies could take advantage of neural measures, such
as ERPs, to further investigate potential commonalities between
disruptions of action selection and their influence on the sense of
agency. Additionally, combining implicit and explicit measures
of agency would help clarify the similarities/differences in cue
integration for different aspects of the experience of agency.
Finally, other contextual factors, and inter-individual variability,
which were not explored here, could influence the sense of
agency, or cue integration. It should be noted that gender was not
fully balanced across all of the present studies, and the potential
impact of gender on manipulations of the sense of agency remains
unclear.
CONCLUSION
Our work suggests that the sense of agency is based on a
continuous integration of several different cues relevant to the
relation between actions and distal outcomes. We show that
the proximal outcomes (here, moving the visual cursor) that
constitute the means toward achieving a distal goal (here,
intercepting Xs) have a strong influence on the sense of agency.
Interestingly, the ease or difficulty of selecting which action
to make also consistently had some influence on the sense of
agency. Thus, the human sense of agency is clearly integrative and
synthetic. Sense of agency is not simply the perception of a match
between one discrete action event and one corresponding discrete
outcome event. Rather, it reflects integration of several different
classes of signal. Our key contribution has been to demonstrate
the contribution of internal and metacognitive signals related to
action selection, in addition to signals related to bodily movement
and external outcome.
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